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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
12,478

UTAH STATE ROAD
C01\1MISSION,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to
determine the meaning and effect of section 208.03 of
the Utah Department of Highway Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, Interim Issue,
March, 1968.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT
Following trial without a jury, the court entered
a judgment of dismissal, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the
trial court affirmed.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant entered into a contract with responder
for construction of an Inter-State highv,'ay located i
Salt Lake County, Utah, designated as No. 1-415-9(23:
305 between 4500 South and Interstate 80. During t~
construction phase of the project, a question was raise
by appellant as to payment for back-fill under sectio
208.03 of the Utah Department of Highways Standar
Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, Ir
terim Issue, March, 1968, which states:

"JV1ethod of Measurement: 'Compaction' sha
be measured by the cubic yard. The quantit
shall be the volume of the 'Roadway Excavation
'Structural Excavation,' and 'Borrow', placed o
the roadway embankment measured in its origirn
position, less the amount paid for backfill. N
payment will be made for material not compactec
such as waste, material used for surcharges, c
initial layer over soft ground placed for a workin
platform for equipment. For compaction throug
cuts, or the natural ground under embankment
the quantity shall be the product of the compacte
area, and a compacted depth of 8 inches.
Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yard <
material in final position in excavated area c
embankment adjacent to a structure limited c
follows:

On fittings, abutments, piers, box culverts, paJ
ments shall be limited to the area bounded b
vertical planes one foot outside the footings t
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the height of the material placed adjacent to the
structure. No payment shall be made for material placed above the elevation of the top of box
culverts or other buried structures except pipe.
On pipes, the measurements shall be limited to
vertical planes two feet wider than the outside
pipe diameter and one-half of the pipe diameter
over the top of the pipe, limited to two feet."
(Emphasis added.) (Ex 2-P)
The term "backfill" as it is used in the context of
this case, describes the process of placing and compacting soil around a pipe which may vary in size. This
procedure was explained by the contractor as follows:

Q. Will you tell us just what is involved in a
typical backfill operation by way of labor and equipment; just the way a backfilling operation would proceed?
A. Well, normally, the backfill in and around the
pipe itself has to be done by hand;; that is, the men
using hand tools of various types. Usually with hand
tools, they have to place the material down underneath
the pipes and around the sides. Other men working
with compaction tools, be they gas tools or gasoline
driven tools, are used to compact this, to consolidate
the material so that the trenches won't settle and the
pipe remains in its proper position. This is a requirement, and this procedure is followed until such time as
the backfill is over the top of the pipe to a sufficient
height to where it will support the use of heavier tools
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or pieces of equipment that might finish this procedurr
on up to the top of the trench. ( TR-14)
The pipes installed by the contractor met the specifications as to procedure and result. The dispute be.
tween the parties arose over payment of backfill as
prescribed in the above specification. The exhibits introduced at trial show that appellant and respondent
agree as to the outside dimensions of the pay area pre·
scribed by the above specification. (Ex 16-P, 15-P,

17-0)

The dispute concerns whether or not the volume
displaced by the pipe should be deducted from the
volume of the outside dimensions of the pay area.
The constractor was asked:

Q. And as I understand your testimony, the only
dispute that we have before the Court today is whether
or not the volume of the pipe is to be deducted or in·
eluded in the computation for backfill?

A. That's correct. (R-94, Tr-37)
The position of defendant was expressed by Mr.
Stewart Knowlton, the resident engineer on the project
(R-97, Tr-40) that contractor was to be paid for "ma·
terial in final position" or "embankment adjacent to a
structure" limited on pipes by the outside dimensions of
the specification and that inasmuch as there is no back·
fill material inside the pipe, payment was made by
deducting the volume of the pipe and paying for ma·

s
terial in final position within the specified area (R-107,
Tr-50 . . . R-108, Tr-51) Contractor claims that th1~
volume of the pipe should be included in payment for
backfill.
The position of the defendant has uniformly been
the same that payments to contractors under the specification for backfill have been made with a deduction
for the volume of the pipe. ( R-123, Tr-66)
The respondent basically agrees with appellants
statement of fact but submits that the issue despite appellant's excursions into state of mind and specification
history is the same; namely, can defendant pay contractor pursuant to section 208.03 for a volume circumscribed by the pipe which contains no backfill material?
ARGUMENT
I
The court did not err in finding that the specifications of the contract relating to measurement of backfill
were not ambiguous.
The court found that section 208.03 of the Interim
Standard Specifications of March 1968, "are not ammiguous and were correctly interpreted by deefndant by
measuring the outside dimensions of the planes described
in 208.03 and deducting therefrom the volume displaced
by the pipe thereby paying only for the actual material
in final position as required by the specification".
Respondent submits that a review of section 208.03
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in accordance with proper statutory interpretation supports the above finding of the court. The provision must
be considered as a whole with a critical inspection of
what parts of the provision limit other parts.
The applicable part of section 208.03 dealing with
backfill states:
"Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yard of
material in final position in excavated area or
embankment adjacent to a structure limited as
follows:"
The statement includes all possible situations in
which backfill can be measured and requires that in
those circumstances involving backfill that measurement
be made for backfill material in final position or em·
bankment adjacent to a structure. It is clear that the
structure being backfilled is not included in the payment
for backfill because the measurement is only for backfill
material in final position or embankment adjacent to
the structure. It should be noted that the structure or
in this case the pipe itself, is paid for under a unit bid
item for pipe. (See Sec. 514.11 Method of Measurement
and Sec. 514.12 Basis of Payment Ex 2-P p. 164) (See
also Sec. 515.06 and 515.07 Ex 2-P p. 165).
Thus, in the general situation the specification
makes the condition that backfill be paid for material
in final position or embankment adjacent to the struc·
ture both of which are phrases which describe the back·
fill material. Respondent submits that this excludes pay·
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ment for backfill for other than material in final position.
The provision states that the payment for backfill
is limited to certain dimensions which are described.
The provision first describes the limitations for footings,
abutments, piers, box culverts wherein payment is limited to an area bounded by vertical planes one foot outside the footings extending to the height of the structure
except for pipes. The general provision that payment
be made for backfill material in final position adjacent
to a structure is thus limited to the area described except for pipes.
Obviously the reason pipes must be limited separately is because they have a different configuration than
the above mentioned structures which are generally rectangular with vertical walls.
On pipes the specification requires that the backfill
material in final position adjacent to the structure be
limited to vertical planes one foot or either side of the
outside diameter of the pipe but unlike the rectangular
type structures previously discussed, allows for payment
above the top of the pipe limited to one half the diameter of the pipe not to exceed two feet. Thus, the
material in final position forms a collar around the pipe
whereas the backfill adjacent to a vertical wall forms
a parallel plane. The condition that measurement be
for backfill material in final place adjacent to a structure varies only in the shape of the payment area which
forms a collar around the pipe because it is round rather
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than a box shape area adjacent to a vertical wall as in
the case of abutments and piers.
Each paragraph subsequent to the definition of
of measurement for backfill material further limits thP
definition to fit the definition to the differently shaped
structures. The limitations do not change the requirement that backfill be paid for material in final position
or embankment adjacent to a structure. Certainly a
collar of material around the pipe is adjacent to the
structure in the same manner as material next to a wall
bounded by planes one foot vertical is adjacent to an
abutment or pier, which are also structures.
A structure as defined in section 101.5 7 of Interim
Standard Specifications, March 1968, includes pipes in
the following items: "Bridges, culverts, catch basins, drop
inlets, retaining walls, curbing, manholes, endwalls, buildings, sewers, service pipes, underdrains, foundation drains,
and other features which may be required in the work
and not otherwise classed herein." Pipes are included in
the major classification of structures in the Interim Spec·
ifications (see Ex 2-P p. 113).
A pipe being classed as a structure and separate
payment being made for the pipe itself it is submitted
that the requirement that backfill, which is the only item
being discussed in this law suit, is for material in final
postion and embankment adjacent to the pipe which
means around the pipe. There is obviously no material
inside the pipe and for that reason the respondent made
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no payment for the volume of the pipe which respondent
submits is a correct interpretation and that to interpret
otherwise' would violate the clear and unambiguous mtent of the provision.
The general rules of contract interpretation concerning the words and phrases used is well stated in
17 Am] ur 2nd, Contracts, Section 24 7, Page 63 7 wherein it states:
"Words used in a contract will be given their
ordinary meaning where nothing appears to show
that they were used in a different sense or have
a technical meaning, and where no unreasonable
or absurd consequences will result from doing so.
Words chosen by the contracting parties should
not be unnaturally forced beyond their ordinary
meaning or given a curious, hidden sense which
nothing but the exigency of a hard case or the
ingenuity of a trained and accute mind can bring
forth. In slightly different language, the rule
may be said to be that the non-technical terms
of every written instrument are to be understood
in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless
they have generally, in respect of the subject matter, as by the knowledge or useage of trade or the
light, acquired a particular sense distinct from the
popular sense of the same words, or unless the
context evidentally points out that in the particular instance or in order to effectuate the immediate intention of the parties, it should be understood in some other peculiar sense."
The law requires that the above specification sec-
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tion 208.03 be given a reasonable interpretation. R1
statement of contracts section 235 states:
"Words are to be taken and understood in the1
natural, usual, and ordinary sense if they are clea
an cl free from ambiguity."

It is submitted that taken as a whole, the specifi
cation as found by the trial court was not ambiguous 01
the ground that payment could be made only for ma
terial in final position or embankment adjacent to th1
structure. It is a simple calculation to measure the out
side dimensions of the backfill pay area and deduct th1
volume of pipe. Respondent submits that to pay fol
other than material in final position, which would b(
the effect of paying for the volume of the pipe, doe!
violence to the above rules of law which require thal
words are to be taken and understood in their natural,
usual, and ordinary sense. The words "backfill,'' "mater·
ial in final position" and "embankment adjacent to a
structure," and "structure" are all words and phrases
which are capable of reasonable interpretation free from
ambiguity. By what stretch of the imagination can the
space occupied by the volume of the pipe be construed
or interpreted as material in final position or embank·
ment adjacent to a structure? That the above contractual
rules of law are applicable to construction contracts, it is
well stated in 13 AmJur 2d, Building and Construction
Contracts, Section 8 Page 11, wherein it states:
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"The principles of law governing the construction
of contracts generally are applicable to building
and construction contracts. Affect must be given
to the intention of the parties as gathered from
a consideration of the entire contract. The contract should receive a practical construction by
the courts . . . Building contracts and accompanying specifications are, the same as other documents, to be construed according to their terms,
and that the terms of the contract are clear and
unambiguous, the court is bound to enforce the
contract as it finds it. The terms of a plain, unambiguous contract cannot be varied or contradicted by parole or extrinsic evidence or by evidence of custom and useage."
Appellant argues that the court must take into
account a number of extrinsic facts and circumstances,
including the situation of the parties, the apparent purpose of the contract, and their prior contracting experience. All of the extrinsic matters which were presented
to the court were allowed into evidence over the objection of respondent's counsel that such excursions were
irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent. However, the
trial judge allowed all testimony into evidence presented
by the contractor and considered those matters brought
out in the testimony. The rule on parole or extrinsic
evidence is stated in 13 AmJur 2d, Section 124, Page
114 wherein it states:

"In accordance with the established principles
governing written instruments generally, parole
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one half the pipe diameter over the top of the
pipe, limited to two feet."
Respondent submits that even paraphrased, the
provision found in appellant's brief as paraphrased, requires payment for material in final position in the
excavated area. It is the requirement that payment be
made for material that makes the contract unambiguous
and clear in its meaning. Payment can only be made for
material and not for something which is not backfill
material. The inside of a pipe is not backfill material.
The very purpose of the pipe is to provide a duct or
opening through which water can drain across the
roadway.
Counsel cites the case of Orren v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 179 Northwest 2d, 166(Minn. 1970), which
involved a case to recover for jewelry theft under a
comprehensive home owner's policy issued by the defendant. The court held that the homeowner's policy
which provided that in any one loss from theft, the insured should not be liable, "for more than $250.00 on
articles of jewelry, including watches, necklaces, bracelets, gems, precious or semi-precious stones, and articles
of gold or platinum ... ", was ambiguous since it neither
clearly provided that insured should receive up to $250.00
for each article of jewelry stolen, nor clearly provided
that insured should not receive more than $250.00 in
the aggregate for all articles of jewelry stolen; accordingly, it would be construed in favor of the insured to
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evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict
the plain and unambiguous terms of a buildino
.
or construction contract, nor can such terms be
varied or contradicted by evidence of custom or
useage. If, however, the terms of the contract are ,
uncertain or ambiguous, parole, or extrinsic evi- i
dence is admissible to explain or interpret the
contract language, such as, for example, parole
evidence of customer useage to show the meaning in which particular terms were used, or to
identify and apply the terms of the writing to
the subject matter.
~

The fact that the judge allowed all of the extrinsic
evidence into evidence makes appellant's argument as to
extrinsic evidence a hollow one in that all of the facton
mentioned were considered by the judge and the ruling
made in favor of the defendant that the contract was
not ambiguous, and that the backfill should be paid for
material in final position, with the volume of the pipe
deducted.
To illustrate the problem of the construction placed
upon the specification found beginning on page 15 of
appellant's brief, the appellant submitted that the pro·
vision for measurement of backfill could reasonably be
paraphrased to read:
"Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yard
in final position in excavated area ... limited as
follows . . . on pipes, measurement may not ex·
ceed a rectangle formed by vertical planes two
feet wider than the outside pipe diameter and

1

i

I

I
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and clear on its face. The court after an examination
of all the facts specifically found that the interpretation
of the defendant-respondent was a correct interpretation, and that the volume of the pipe should be deducted.
It is a black letter rule of law that the findings of
judgment of the trial court are presumed to be correct
and valid and the reviewing court is to view the evidence and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable
to the findings. See Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13 U2d 422,
37 P2d 762, ( 1962), Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu 17 U2d
125, 405 Pd 346, ( 1965) Citizens Casualty Co., of New
York v. Hackett 17 U2d 304, 410 P2d 767. (1966)
Beehive Security Company v. Bush 16 U2d 328, 400
P2cl, 506. ( 1965)
As stated in the Hackett Case, supra,
"In conformity with the cardinal rules of review
which we have had occasion to affirm in prior
cases, it is our duty to indulge the presumption
that the findings and judgment of the trial comi
are correct; and to affirm unless the appellant
sustains the burden, which is his, of demonstrating to the contrary."
The cardinal rules of review are outlined in Charlton v. Hackett 11 U2d 389, 359 P2 1060 ( 1961), as
follows:
"In considering the attack on the findings and
judgment of the trial court, it is our duty to follow these cardinal rules of review; to indulge
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provide that the insureds should receive for each stoler
article, either its value or $250.00 whichever was less
The court in that case was involved with a specific
provision which the trial court found was ambiguous
The court allowed evidence of a subsequent polic 1
change in the language.

The court in the present case based on the Orren
v. Phoenix Insurance Co. case, allowed evidence that
the wording in the specification had been changed b)
the commission. Counsel states on page 18 that thil
means that the fact that the contract provision wa1
amended by the commission shows that the commission

thought it was ambiguous. The court after considering
this argument, rejected it and found that the contract
provision was not ambiguous knowing full well that the
provision had been changed. The trial judge had aU
information before it over counsel's objection as to
what changes were made and why they were made
and found after taking into consideration all of the
evidence which was placed before him that the con·
tract was not ambiguous.

II
The court did not err in finding that defendant's
interpretation of the contract provision was correct and
in not adopting plaintiff's interpretation.
In response to part 2
pondent submits that the
the contractual provision
the contract provision was

of appellant's argument, res·
contractor's interpretation of
was not reasonable in that
not ambiguous and was plain
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them a presumption of validity and correctness·
to require the appellant to sustain the burden of
showing error; to review the record in the light
most favorable to them; and not to disturb them
if they find substantial support in the evidence.''
I

It is submitted that the trial court used proper rules
of contract interpretation and considered all of the evi·
dence placed before it by the defendant and plaintiff.
As stated in Maw v. Noble 10 U2d 440, 354 P2 121
( 1960):
"We are in agreement with the well recognized
rule urged by def cndants that where there is un·
certainty or ambiguity, the contract should be
strictly construed against him who draws it. But
it is to be kept in mind that this rule applies only
where there is some genuine lack of certainty and
not to the strained or merely fanciful or wishful
interpretations that may be indulged in. The
primary and more fundamental rule is that the
contract must be looked at realistically in the
light of the circumstances under which it was
entered into, and if the intent of the parties can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty it must
be given effect."
As stated in Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk
7 U2d 163, 321 P2d 221. ( 1958):
"Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor
the court has any right to ignore or modify con·
ditions which are clearly expressed merely be·
cause it may subject one of the parties to hard·
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ship, but they must be enforced in accordance
with the intention manifehted by the language
used by the parties to the contract. (citing
cases)"
The finding and judgment of the court after all
evidence had been presented was that the provision relative to backfill was not ambiguous and required the
State Road Commission to pay for backfill material by
the cubic yard of material in final position, or embankment adjacent to a structure which material the court
found does not include the valume of the pipe which
contains no backfill material and that the State Road
Commission was correct in deducting the valume of the
pipe.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the trial court was correct
in its finding and judgment and prays this court affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

ectfullv submitted,

D~ong£~

Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601

